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Abstract
Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better or worse. In the United States, the rise
of the neo-Kraepelinian nosology of DSM-III resuscitated Kraepelin's work but also differed from
many of his ideas, especially his overtly biological ontology. This neo-Kraepelinian system has led
to concerns regarding overdiagnosis of psychiatric syndromes ("nosologomania") and perhaps
scientifically ill-founded psychopharmacological treatment for presumed neo-Kraepelinian
syndromes. In the early 20th century, Karl Jaspers provided unique insights into Kraepelin's work,
and Jaspers even proposed an alternate nosology which, though influenced by Kraepelin, also
introduced the concept of ideal types. Jaspers' critique of Kraepelin may help us reformulate our
current neo-Kraepelinian nosology for the better.
Review
Introduction
When Emil Kraepelin laid out his vision of psychiatric
nosology at the turn of the twentieth century, he was met
with plaudits but also opposition. The voices of opposi-
tion would gain ground after Kraepelin's death until the
late twentieth century, when his views were reborn in the
American neo-Kraepelinian school of psychiatry, influen-
tial in the revolutionary revision of the American nosolo-
gical system, DSM-III, in 1980. Another contemporary
critique of Kraepelin's nosology, by Karl Jaspers, has been
underappreciated, however. In this paper, I review the
evolution of Kraepelin's nosology in the United States,
and examine Jaspers' critique of Kraepelin's work, espe-
cially the ideal type method, so as to improve our current
neo-Kraepelinian nosology.
The psychopharmacology revolution
After Kraepelin's initial popularity, his system was largely
eclipsed, especially in the US, by the rise of the psychoan-
alytic movement [1], where (in the 1940s–1970s) there
was a reversion to the nineteenth century insanity model,
relabeled the neurosis-psychosis continuum [2]: every-
one, patients or not, sick or healthy, fell on that contin-
uum somewhere; the disease tradition in medicine was
not considered central to psychiatry [1].
A turning point that led to the rebirth of Kraepelin's
nosology began in the 1950s, when lithium was intro-
duced for mania, chlorpromazine for schizophrenia, and
imipramine for depression [3]. These medications were
increasingly used and validated in clinical trials, and by
the 1970s, a practical problem led to reassessment of the
Freudian consensus on the neurosis-psychosis model [4].
If lithium worked specifically for mania, tricyclic antide-
pressants for depression, and phenothiazines for schizo-
phrenia, then it would seem that Kraepelin's nosology was
no longer therapeutically irrelevant. Despite later experi-
ence that these agents are relatively nonspecific [3], their
apparent specificity in the 1950s–1970s led to enthusiasm
for linking them to Kraepelin's nosology. The birth of psy-
chopharmacology suggested that, at least for pharmaco-
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logical treatment as well as for regulatory approval and
drug-marketing [2], and surely also for service-reimburse-
ment purposes, Kraepelin's schema seemed quite service-
able [4].
The "neo-Kraepelinians," many of whom were American
or European researchers impressed by this process, began
to test Kraepelin's nosology using new psychometric
methods with demonstrable reliability and utility [1]. (In
the US, headquartered at the Washington University in St.
Louis, this group was famously led by Eli Robins and Sam-
uel Guze). In the US-UK study of 1970 [5], researchers
showed that American psychiatrists diagnosed many con-
ditions they saw in New York as schizophrenia, based on
loose definitions of the neurosis-psychosis continuum,
while British psychiatrists in London diagnosed few con-
ditions as schizophrenia (using Kraepelinian criteria),
instead identifying most other conditions as mood or anx-
iety disorders. Specifically, comparing New York to Lon-
don, schizophrenia was diagnosed in 65% vs 34%, and
"depressive psychoses" in 7.2% vs. 32.8%, respectively.
These were the largest differences; UK psychiatrists also
diagnosed personality disorders more, though still infre-
quently, than New York psychiatrists (8.4% vs. 0.8%).
When rediagnosed using standardized diagnostic criteria
(the Present State Examination), only 32% of the Ameri-
can sample met schizophrenia definitions, as did 26% of
the London sample; affective illness was more common
(36.4% in New York, 47.2% in London) and personality
disorders uncommon (2.4% in New York vs. 4.4% in Lon-
don). Of those diagnosed with schizophrenia in New
York, 53% were misdiagnosed, of which 71.3% had mood
disorders. In London, schizophrenia was less frequently
misdiagnosed (36.5%), but again mood disorders were
the usual missed diagnoses (73.2%). In my reanalysis of
those data using confidence intervals and relative risks,
schizophrenia was misdiagnosed 46% more frequently in
New York than London, mostly missing mood disorders
(RR = 1.46, 95% confidence intervals 1.07, 2.01). The
American approach seemed extremely broad, and the new
medications suggested that making finer distinctions was
practically important.
Though some have suggested that the rise of the neo-
Kraepelinian DSM-III occurred independently of the psy-
chopharmacology revolution [1], contemporaries have
observed that the two seemed to play off each other at the
time (Ross J. Baldessarini MD, Frederick K. Goodwin MD,
personal communications, March 2006). Indeed, I sug-
gest that the psychopharmacology revolution laid the
groundwork for the neo-Kraepelinian restoration.
The rise of DSM-III
Gerald Klerman, who coined the term 'neo-Kraepelinian'
[6], outlined the benefits of DSM-III as follows:
First, it embodies the concept of multiple disorders, reaf-
firming psychiatry's acceptance of the modern medical
model of disease.
Second, and for the first time, an official nomenclature
has incorporated operational criteria with exclusion and
inclusion criteria...based on manifest descriptive psycho-
pathology rather than on presumed etiology – psychody-
namic, social, or biological. This reliance on descriptive
rather than etiological criteria does not represent an aban-
donment of the ideal of modern scientific medicine that
classification and diagnosis should be by causation.
Rather, it represents a strategic mode of dealing with the
frustrating reality that, for most of the disorders we cur-
rently treat, there is only limited evidence for their etiolo-
gies....
Third, DSM-III underwent field testing for reliability.
Never before have practitioners of a medical specialty par-
ticipated in a test of the reliability of their nomenclature....
Fourth, a multiaxial system was introduced to accommo-
date the diverse aspects of our patients' existence.
Fifth, there is implicit in the creation of DSM-III...the
necessity for change – the push for DSM-IV is already
apparent. The changes that appear in DSM-IV should be
determined by the state of evidence rather than the asser-
tions of competing ideological camps [7].
Klerman addresses the issue of the uniqueness of individ-
ual patients well:
Most American psychiatrists, trained in the Meyerian tra-
dition, have been reluctant to rely on diagnostic distinc-
tions because of the acknowledged diversity of human
attributes. Furthermore, in making clinical decisions
about patients, diagnosis – reliable or not, valid or not –
is only one criterion in decision-making....A diagnosis
alone is not sufficient to account for all decision making;
other attributes of the individual are crucial in the clinical
context. No diagnostic system can encompass all these
multiple attributes. The development of the multiaxial
system represents a novel attempt to acknowledge this
clinical experience....For scientific investigation in medi-
cine and psychiatry, the unit of investigation is the disor-
der, while for clinical practice the unit is the individual
[7].
One continues to hear this criticism today. Klerman's
comments make it clear that the developers of DSM-III
were not unaware of this potential problem. Klerman
makes the distinction between diagnosis and clinical deci-
sion-making. A diagnosis is necessary, but not sufficient,
for decision-making, he says. But practice today often con-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:10 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/10
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sists of listing symptoms, making a diagnosis, and then
prescribing a usually pharmacological treatment, without
any further considerations. Perhaps with managed care
insurance is relevant, when time limits (imposed by oth-
ers or by oneself for financial gain) lead to less emphasis
on individual differences among persons.
In a debate with Klerman, the psychoanalyst Robert
Michels made a famous critique that centered on the lack
of attention to subjective psychological states in the neo-
Kraepelinian approach:
I hope that whatever happens in this debate, we do not
lose all that is of value in American psychiatry that does
not fit in 300 pages of operational criteria....In construct-
ing a nosology, we must first decide whether we want to
define the domain of the discussion as that which we can
describe precisely or that which we believe to be relevant.
DSM-III opts for the former. If this criterion for DSM-III
had been employed in 1850, we would not have devel-
oped the concept of dementia praecox or schizophrenia
by 1950; the initial formulation was too unreliable. The
heterogeneity of our field is a potent argument for includ-
ing, not excluding, a variety of concepts and ideas when
developing nosology [7].
One definition of scientific method in nosology is the use
of empirically testable hypotheses [8]. However, some
hypotheses are certainly very difficult, if not impossible,
to test empirically. Those related to subjective states, as in
psychiatry, are especially difficult to test objectively. What
should we do with these subjective states, and the hypoth-
eses which involve them? Should we simply exclude them
from the field of psychiatry, or perhaps include them but
deny them any scientific validity (instead asserting that
they are value judgments, as Kendler does) [8]? If we
exclude them, we are in danger of creating what Michels
calls 'mindless psychiatry.' If we say nothing or little about
subjective states, psychiatry as a field would seem to lose
a great deal of relevance to what patients experience and
for which they want assistance [9].
Michels also coined the term 'invisible college' to describe
the neo-Kraepelinian school in St. Louis that was heavily
involved in preparing DSM-III [7]. The phrase has a
slightly sinister flair to it, suggesting something of a con-
spiracy, though if there was a conspiracy, it was likely of
events rather than of persons (though the protagonists in
this drama, such as Robins, personalized this conflict with
their opponents; R. Baldessarini MD, personal communi-
cation, March 2006). There is no evidence of an explicit
conspiracy to start using drugs instead of psychoanalysis;
to the contrary, Spitzer sought to mollify the interests of
psychoanalysis, as he had to do to get the revision through
the APA assembly [10].
Karl Jaspers' earlier critique of Kraepelin
Karl Jaspers, in his 1913 magnum opus, General Psychopa-
thology  [11], provided an earlier critique of Kraepelin's
work which was perhaps less appreciated by international
psychiatry (and certainly practically unknown in the
United States).
While critical, Jaspers was also appreciative of Kraepelin.
In the Appendix (written in the 1940s) to General Psycho-
pathology, he specifically also links Kraepelin's work to the
incipient rise of psychopharmacology:
Kraepelin was responsible for one of the most fruitful
lines of research, the investigation of the whole life-
history of the patient. He...laid the foundations for
psycho-pharmacology....But Kraepelin's basic concep-
tual world remained a somatic one which in the com-
pany of the majority of doctors he held as the only
important one for medicine, not only as a matter of
preference but in an absolute sense. The psychological
discussions in his Textbook are brilliant in parts and
he succeeded with them as it were unwittingly. He
himself regards them as temporary stopgaps until
experiment, microscope and test-tube permitted
objective investigation.... [11] (pp. 853–855).
I think that the most important critique made by Jaspers
of Kraepelin's nosology has to do with the use of the
method of 'ideal types', which Jaspers borrowed from his
mentor and friend, the sociologist Max Weber. The con-
nection between Jaspers and Weber has also been insuffi-
ciently noted. In his discussion of the nature of meaning
(subjective understanding, Verstehen, as opposed to Erk-
lären, or the objective causal-empirical approach) in psy-
chiatry, Jaspers writes in a footnote: 'The work of Max
Weber was mostly responsible for my deliberate use of
understanding as a method which would be in keeping
with our great cultural traditions....This present book
[General Psychopathology] (was) greeted as something radi-
cally new, although all I had done was to link psychiatric
reality with the traditional humanities. Looking back
now, it seems astonishing that that these had been so for-
gotten and had grown so alien to psychiatry' [11] (p 301–
302).
Specific to nosology, Jaspers applies the ideal type method
to the classification scheme of personality disorders, a
scheme which he views as useful but not applying exactly
to specific individuals in the real world. I would suggest
that this analysis of ideal-types as the underlying method
of psychiatric nosology might be extended to the entire
current DSM system for all psychiatric disorders:
'If we think of a property as something lasting, under-
standable in its manifestations, in modes of reaction andPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:10 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/10
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expression and the general behavior of the individual, we
are in process of developing a type. We form the property
and all its consequences into a construct and viewing it as
a whole recognize it as something obviously connected. If
we then make one or several such properties the basis of a
comprehensive totality and proceed to apply it to the per-
son as a whole, noticing the meaningful connection
between this and what the individual experiences and
does, we are in the process of designing a personality-type.
Such types remain ideal-types even if we have conceived
them from our scrutiny of real people....They only occur
in reality as approximate forms, as classical borderline
cases....Thus the whole meaning of types makes it impos-
sible for any one individual to be sufficiently character-
ized by any single type.' [11] (p. 434)
Jaspers also had other unique insights about Kraepelin's
ideas and about diagnosis in general in his main chapter
on nosology (chapter XII of Part IV of General Psychopa-
thology, 'The synthesis of disease entities – Nosology', pp.
564–616). There Jaspers directly addresses the perspective
of the empirical/biological school, led in his age by
Kraepelin, and opposes the concept that psychiatric ill-
nesses could be reduced to brain diseases, while recogniz-
ing the utility of the clinical empirical approach:
'There has been no fulfillment of the hope that clinical
observation of psychic phenomena, of the life-history and
of the outcome might yield characteristic groupings which
would subsequently be confirmed in the cerebral findings, and
thus pave the way for the brain-anatomists....The original
question: are there only stages and variants of one unitary
psychosis or is there a series of disease-entities which we can
delineate, now finds its answer: there are neither. The latter
view is right in so far that the idea of disease-entities has
become a fruitful orientation for the investigations of spe-
cial psychiatry. The former view is right in so far that no
actual disease-entities exist in scientific psychiatry.' [11]
(pp. 568–570, all italics in original text)
One might disagree in retrospect with that last statement,
since at least some disease-entities, it can be argued, exist
within the psychotic syndromes [12]. Earlier, in the Intro-
duction to General Psychopathology, Jaspers also had com-
mented:
'In the psychiatric assessment of a case...except in the case
of well-known cerebral changes, diagnosis is the least rel-
evant factor. If it is made the main issue, it will prejudge
what ideally should emerge from the investigation. What
matters is the process of analysis. The chaos of phenom-
ena should not be blotted out with some diagnostic label
but bring illumination through the way it is systematically
ordered and related. Psychiatric diagnosis is too often a
sterile running round in circles so that only a few phe-
nomena are brought into the orbit of conscious knowl-
edge.' [11] (p. 20)
But here in Part IV, Jaspers provides a classification
scheme, heavily influenced by Kraepelin, remarkably sim-
ilar to the nosology DSM-III and ICD-9:
'We have detailed knowledge of particular phenomena, of
causal connections and meaningful connections, etc., but
complex disease entities remain an endless, inextricable
web. The individual configurations of disease are not like
plants which we can classify in a herbarium. Rather it is
just what is a 'plant' – an illness – that is most uncertain.
What do we diagnose?...Diagnosis is expected to charac-
terize in a comprehensive manner the whole morbid
occurrence which has assailed the person and which
stands as a well-defined entity among others....But how-
ever we devise [a diagnostic schema] we realize that it can-
not work; that we can only make temporary and arbitrary
classifications; that there are a number of different possi-
bilities which account for the fact that different workers
construct entirely different schemata; and that classifica-
tion is always contradictory in theory and never quite
squares with the facts. Why then do we keep on making
this vain attempt? In the first place we want to see properly
what this idea of disease-entity has achieved in respect to
the over-all picture of existing psychic disorders, and partic-
ularly where we have failed because it is the basic and rad-
ical failure which makes us aware of the actual state of our
knowledge. In the second place every presentation of special
psychiatry requires some classification of psychosis at its
base. Without some such schema it cannot order its mate-
rial. In the third place we need a classification in order to
make statistical investigations of a large case material.' [11]
(p. 604, all italics in original text)
To translate: Jaspers is saying that psychiatric nosology is
like botany; it is a clinical description of what we observe
about persons with mental problems, much like botany is
an observational description of the characteristics of
plants. The larger question of "What is a mental illness?"
is like asking the question "What is a plant?" It is much
easier to describe specific plants than to fully explain the
nature of being a plant (one might call it "planthood").
Jaspers is, perhaps, taking a stance here on the old philo-
sophical debate about the particular versus the universal,
and saying we should stick with the particular. He notes
that nosology can never be definitive or absolutely valid
(as is the case with everything in his philosophy), but he
does not conclude, unlike many critics today, that psychi-
atric diagnosis is therefore useless. It has three utilities: 1.
we need specific diagnoses by which to judge the larger
question of overall mental illness; 2. we cannot engage in
any specific aspect of psychiatry (I think this is what he
means by "special psychiatry") without having somePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:10 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/10
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organizing schema for the whole (a general nosology; for
Jaspers defining psychosis forms the basis for his nosol-
ogy); 3. we need to make diagnoses reliably so we can
engage in research (which is necessary for science, and Jas-
pers values science a great deal).
Jaspers goes on to provide the characteristics of an ideal
nosology, features which DSM-III and IV would be seen as
meeting rather poorly:
'An ideal schema would have to satisfy the following
requirements: It must be such that any given case would
have only one place within it and every case should have
a place. The whole plan must have a compelling objectiv-
ity so that different observers can classify cases in the same
way....We abandon the idea of disease-entity and once
more have to bear in mind continually the various points
of view (as to causes, psychological structure, anatomical
findings, course of illness and outcome) and in face of the
facts we have to draw the line where none exists. Such clas-
sification therefore has only a provisional value. It is a fic-
tion which will discharge its function if it proves to be the
most apt for the time. There is no 'natural' schema which
would accommodate every case.' [11] (p. 605)
These are important caveats. Jaspers is in effect saying that
diagnosis at its most supraordinate level (ideal types) has
a basic and radical failure: it cannot be definitive or com-
plete. Yet he goes on to acknowledge that psychiatry
needs, both for practical and scientific purposes, to have a
nosology. He then sketches a practical classification,
largely derived from Kraepelin, as below, realizing, from
the outset and quite explicitly that he is not carving nature
at its joints, or identifying definitive disease-entities.
With those caveats, Jaspers proposes a nosology quite sim-
ilar to DSM-III and ICD-9. He proposes dividing psychiat-
ric conditions into three main groups [11]: Group I,
'Known somatic illnesses with psychic disturbances' (such
as cerebral tumors, meningitis), approximates DSM's 'Axis
III' which describes medical conditions that can influence
psychiatric disorders. Group II, 'The three major psycho-
ses' ('genuine epilepsy', schizophrenia, and manic-depres-
sive illness), would correspond with the major mood and
psychotic disorders on DSM's 'Axis I' of primary psychiat-
ric conditions (with epilepsy now moved to Axis III since
a cerebral basis has been established for it). Group III is
the 'Personality disorders', which corresponds to DSM's
'Axis II', also defined as personality disorders. Heuris-
tically, with the caveats given previously, Jaspers goes on
to accept Kraepelin's definition of the distinction between
schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness based on the
outcome criterion as the main factor, i.e., invariably poor
outcome with schizophrenia and frequent recovery with
manic-depressive illness.
Jaspers' skepticism about nosology, however, does not
end in nihilism. Because Kraepelin did not carve nature at
its joints, Jaspers does not thereby reject Kraepelin's nosol-
ogy. And Jaspers' acceptance of nosology is not merely
practical; it is consistent with his entire philosophy that
any human activity, including science, is never absolute in
its knowledge; yet we can still have quite useful, even sci-
entifically valid, knowledge nonetheless. Jaspers, in a
word, was not a positivist, and his view of psychiatry in
specific, and science in general, was more consistent with
what philosophers of science today consider to be the
nature of scientific work [13].
Empathy and understandability
Readers familiar with Jaspers' work may have been most
influenced by the section of General Psychopathology where
Jaspers emphasizes empathy as a criterion for diagnosing
delusions. Indeed, Jaspers' acceptance of the affective dis-
order/schizophrenia distinction in the nosology debate
was in part based on the distinction between conditions
with which one could empathize, those in whom mean-
ingful connections could be made, and those which were
not understandable. He felt that this distinction, based on
the Erkalren/Verstehen distinction, would provide one of
the few organizing principles for nosology:
'The most profound distinction in psychic life seems to be
that between what is meaningful and allows empathy and
what in its particular way is un-understandable, "mad" in
the literal sense, schizophrenic psychic life (even though
there may be no delusions). Pathological psychic life of
the first kind we can comprehend vividly enough as an
exaggeration or diminution of known phenomena and as
an appearance of such phenomena without the usual
causes or motives. Pathological psychic life of the second
kind we cannot adequately comprehend in this way.
Instead we find changes of the most general kind for
which we have no empathy but which in some way we try
to make comprehensible from an external point of
view....The affective illnesses appear to us to be open to
empathy and natural but the various types of "madness"
do not seem open to empathy and appear unnatural.' [11]
(pp. 577–578)
Perhaps it is this idea of Jaspers' that has attracted the
most nosological attention, as it has become the source of
the 'un-understandability' criterion for delusions. Numer-
ous critiques of this view have been made, many of which
I share. For the purpose of this paper I wish to put empha-
sis on Jaspers' underappreciated idea of ideal-types as
being central to psychiatric nosology.
Ideal types and psychiatric nosology
Much of Jaspers' nosology hinges on the concept of the
ideal type, which is meant as a standard, or simplified,Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:10 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/10
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version of reality [14,15]. Let us take the example of histo-
rians, because this is where the concept was developed
[16], yet realizing that everything that is said here can
apply to the psychologist or the psychiatrist when faced
with clinical aspects of treating patients. Historians
observe certain aspects of a historical event. They then
take those aspects that seem to be the most striking, those
that are the most unique or interesting to them, and they
abstract those aspects from the rest of the details of the
event. Connected in the abstract, limited to the most sali-
ent aspects of the historical reality, historians thus create
the ideal type for that event [14,15].
The point of the ideal type is not to directly correspond to
reality, but to highlight certain aspects of reality that
might otherwise get lost in the varying details of concrete
reality. The ideal type is not seen as a scientific theory
either, which changes as more and more information on
the empirical details of concrete reality is gathered. The
ideal type is itself the standard to which concrete reality is
compared [15]. By using the word 'ideal', Weber did not
mean that the ideal type is the best type, or better than
concrete reality; he meant to emphasize the fact that it is
an abstraction, a conceptualization made away from con-
crete reality [14].
A conceptual analogy to the ideal type is a ruler, by which
objects are measured [15]. The ruler is not made based on
empirical comparisons to reality. It simply is created by
us, by humans, stipulated to be a certain length, and then
used to measure real objects. Similarly, ideal types are
concepts that are created by historians, and the facts of
history are measured against them. The point of ideal
types is to help us understand the meaning of those facts
of history.
Ideal types might be seen as a hybrid between an essence
(the necessary feature of something) and a tool (a meas-
urement). One must acknowledge a large literature, espe-
cially in sociology, for and against the ideal type concept,
so it is far from a settled simple notion. But it can at least
be seen as one approach that, in the hands of Weber and
Jaspers at least, seemed to bear some fruit.
Wiggins and Schwartz have suggested [17], and I wish to
agree, that the DSM system of nosology in psychiatry can
be seen as utilizing the same method. The diagnoses in
DSM-IV are not 'real' entities; they are abstractions. (This
is also relevant, probably, to internal medicine; I am not
claiming that psychiatry is inherently different from the
rest of medicine in this context). No single patient exactly
meets the specific criteria of any diagnosis; every patient is
uniquely different in some way. This reflects the concrete
uniqueness of human existence, that aspect of human cul-
tural reality which Weber and his predecessors so empha-
sized. Thus, the DSM diagnoses are not meant to directly
correspond to clinical reality one hundred percent. Nor
are they meant to represent explanatory theories of diag-
noses, which are to be changed as more and more empir-
ical evidence is gathered. In fact, this can happen, as noted
previously, because the humanities can utilize the meth-
ods of the sciences to a certain degree. But, in principle, at
root, the DSM criteria are stipulated by psychiatrists based
on a consensus of their clinical experience, to best pick out
the essence of various clinical situations, so as to best
allow communication and research in a common lan-
guage. This is an ideal type approach.
Thus, it is vain to criticize the DSM nosology for not cor-
responding to clinical reality. That is not its goal. The
nosology is used to categorize clinical reality, not to copy
it. Nor is it useful to criticize it for being abstract or for not
being based completely on empirical evidence. Diagnoses
cannot be established in psychiatry completely on the
basis of empirical evidence, for the same reason that his-
tory cannot be comprehensively understood with facts
and figures alone. Interpretations of meanings and moti-
vations are unavoidable. Thus abstraction is necessary,
unless one was to limit psychiatry to nothing but observa-
tion of the details of each clinical case, with no attempt at
a more general level of understanding.
It is also no solution to criticize the DSM nosology based
on the idea that clinical diagnostic categories (e.g., bipolar
disorder) just have no correspondence to neurobiology
and that we really need is to use psychopathological states
(e.g., melancholia) or neuropsychological entities (e.g.,
working memory), and then correlate them with biologi-
cal mechanisms [18]. This approach, so popular among
the biologically minded, would be similar to saying, in
1900, that angina pectoris is a useless way to understand
heart disease, and we need to instead start with radiating
left arm pain. To reject syndromes of diagnosis for their
composite symptoms is not a conceptual advance. One
cannot prejudge the matter; it may well turn out that some
of our clinical diagnoses, if honed better with more clini-
cal research, well capture the biological mechanisms. But
if we give up the clinical nosology research project, in
favor of the biological soup du jour, we will never know.
Ultimately, the DSM nosology may lead to the recogni-
tion of some specific diseases, quantitatively defined in
demonstrable abnormalities in brain structure or function
or in genetic coding. At that point, the Verstehen-oriented
ideal type approach will give way more completely to the
Erklären-oriented empirical approach. However, given the
uniqueness of human experience, it is likely that there will
always be a role for some kind of ideal type approach in
psychiatry.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:10 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/10
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Where neo-Kraepelinian psychiatry has gone wrong
A critique of Kraepelin's nosology using the ideal type
method derived from Jaspers (and Weber) becomes espe-
cially relevant when we examine the difference between
Kraepelin himself and neo-Kraepelinianism, and the play-
ing out of that difference in contemporary psychiatry.
As is well known, Kraepelin's nosology was focused on the
major psychoses, with the main distinction between two
primary illnesses, manic-depressive insanity and demen-
tia praeocox. Kraepelin held that these two illnesses were
disease-entities that they were due to biological abnor-
malities of the brain and body. Kraepelin was thus com-
mitted, as philosophers would put it, to a biological
ontology for psychosis [1].
The neo-Kraepelinian school gave up this biological
ontology, at least overtly [6], but extended Kraepelin's
nosology beyond the major psychoses – to affective disor-
ders (with non-psychotic unipolar major depressive disor-
der being very frequently diagnosed), anxiety disorders
(especially generalized anxiety disorder, but also panic
disorder, social anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compul-
sive disorder), personality disorders (with a score of dif-
ferent labels), and other conditions (e.g., attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder – ADHD, post-traumatic stress dis-
order – PTSD). Some of these designations (like GAD)
may have been mainly due to political compromises with
psychoanalysts anxious to retain some categories that
would capture their bread-and-butter label of 'neurotic
depression' [19], but nonetheless the effect of the neo-
Kraepelinian revisions of DSM-III and DSM-IV has been
what van Praag has called 'nosologomania' – many disor-
ders have been designated to 'exist' [20].
The problem in practice is that a DSM designation seems
to translate, in the minds of many practitioners today,
into the equivalent of a disease-entity. (I have discussed
what characterizes a disease-entity as opposed to syn-
dromes or symptoms elsewhere [14]; for current pur-
poses, I mean by disease-entity an abnormality of the
brain or body which might be caused in various ways but
whose ultimate final pathway involves major biological
abnormalities. For further discussion of this topic, see the
above reference). In other words, where Kraepelin viewed
his nosology as biologically committed to disease-entities,
yet limited to severe psychotic conditions, contemporary
neo-Kraepelinian American psychiatry denies a biological
commitment in theory but practices as if there were bio-
logical commitments to over 300 DSM-defined entities
[13], justifying pharmacological treatment [13]. Yet, in
the tradition of scientific medicine dating from William
Osler (as opposed to previous unscientific somatic
approaches), physicians have been taught to use medica-
tions to treat diseases, not just symptoms [13,21]. (Again
this is a key issue discussed in more detail in those texts;
there I review the historical and conceptual background
for supporting the view that scientific medicine is disease-
oriented, not simply symptom-oriented). For many psy-
chiatrists, DSM diagnoses are treated as proxies for dis-
eases, and medications are duly prescribed, with not
much in the way of intervening hesitation. As a result,
symptoms hypertrophied into diagnoses appear to pro-
vide justification for medication prescription [21].
An example of this phenomenon may be the case of 'adult
ADHD'. This condition was hardly described in the psy-
chiatric literature until the 1990s. Even then most of the
evidence suggested that it was extremely rare [22], with
childhood ADHD either resolving in adulthood or chang-
ing its presentation into other adult psychiatric disorders.
Yet, coincidental with the marketing of a drug in the
United States (Strattera, atomoxitene) for presumed adult
ADHD in 2002, a great increase of interest in the diagnosis
of this condition has occurred [23], despite a relative pau-
city of evidence for the nosologic validity of this condi-
tion. For instance, proponents of the validity of adult
ADHD often cite the National Comorbidity Survey analy-
sis which found that 3% of the adult population met cri-
teria for this condition, and that 36.3% of those
individuals were retrospectively diagnosable with child-
hood ADHD [24]. However, 84.1% of those with pre-
sumed adult ADHD were also diagnosable with mood
disorders (about equally bipolar disorder or unipolar
depression) [24]. While this might be called comorbidity,
it might also represent a lack of syndromal specificity, a
major mark against diagnostic validity [25].
Concerns about nosologomania are especially relevant
given some evidence of political and economic forces
inside and outside of psychiatry that may be using our
current neo-Kraepelinian framework for their own pur-
poses. Critics have especially noted the influence of the
pharmaceutical industry in 'selling sickness' or 'disease-
mongering' [26], creating syndromes where none previ-
ously existed so as to create a marketplace for their drugs
[19].
In my view, much of this diagnostic confusion stems from
the neo-Kraepelinian attempt to stay 'neutral' ontologi-
cally. In practice, clinicians often make biological assump-
tions about treatment (e.g., using medications
preferentially to psychosocial interventions) without sci-
entific reasons to do so [13]. Instead, Jaspers' concept of
ideal types, by reminding us of the abstract nature of our
diagnoses and the fact that they do not necessarily corre-
spond to natural disease-entities, may help contemporary
psychiatry to better understand the conceptual nature of
our diagnoses, getting a better handle on which ones
likely are biologically-based disease-entities and whichPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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ones are not, and thereby making more appropriate deci-
sions about which kinds of interventions are most appro-
priate. Further, this approach more honestly attends to
our etiological ignorance (where present) about many
psychiatric syndromes, and thus would lead to more cau-
tious conclusions regarding pharmacological approaches
to treatment. This perspective does not deny the utility of
some pharmacological palliative treatment for symptoms,
but it would give us conceptual clarity about what sce-
nario holds (palliative symptom treatment or more defin-
itive disease-oriented treatment), with practical
consequences (less emphasis on medication treatment for
superficial symptoms, and more for disease-oriented
treatment).
Conclusion
Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better
or worse. Today we need to better understand which diag-
noses carry with them the implication of being biological
disease-entities, thus requiring more emphasis on medica-
tion treatment, and which diagnoses are different (or at
least about which we are relative ignorant regarding bio-
logically-based etiology). The concept of ideal types,
derived from Karl Jaspers, may help us reformulate our
current neo-Kraepelinian nosology and thereby improve
current psychiatric practice.
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